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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 In these consolidated appeals, Jose Lopez, Pedro 
Esparza-Diaz, Pedro Arrelucea-Zamudio, and Silvestre Brito-
Hernandez (“Appellants”) challenge the constitutionality and 
reasonableness of the sentences they received after pleading 
guilty to illegal reentry, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 
 5 
(b)(2).
1
  Appellants claim that their Fifth Amendment rights 
were violated as a result of the Department of Justice‟s 
(“DOJ”) implementation of “fast-track” early disposition 
programs in select judicial districts.  Section 5K3.1 of the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) permits a 
district court to depart not more than four levels pursuant to 
an early disposition program authorized by the Attorney 
General for the particular district.  In districts where fast-track 
programs are in place, qualifying defendants have the option 
to plead guilty immediately, in exchange for the 
Government‟s filing of a motion to depart pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1.  None of the districts within the Third 
Circuit have a fast-track program. 
Although Appellants acknowledge that fast-track 
programs are defensible in districts with a high volume of 
immigration cases, such as districts along the southwest 
border of the United States, they challenge the reasoning 
behind authorizing these programs in districts with a low 
volume of immigration cases and in non-border districts.  
Appellants maintain that fast-track programs have been 
approved in an arbitrary manner, creating a disparity among 
similarly situated defendants that violates their Fifth 
Amendment right to equal protection.  Additionally, 
                                                 
1
 By order of the Clerk on December 22, 2010, we 
granted the Government‟s motion to consolidate these appeals 
for purposes of disposition.  In addressing the constitutional 
argument, we refer to Appellants collectively.  We describe 
their individual arguments only insofar as necessary to 
highlight the distinctions in their bases for appeal. 
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Appellants challenge the reasonableness of their sentences.  
We determine that the DOJ‟s implementation of fast-track 
programs is rationally related to several legitimate 
governmental interests and does not violate Appellants‟ Fifth 
Amendment rights.  Further, the sentences imposed were 
procedurally and substantively reasonable.  We will affirm 
the judgments of sentence entered by each District Court. 
I.  Background 
 Fast-track programs were initially established in the 
mid-1990s in federal judicial districts along the border 
between the United States and Mexico – in Texas, New 
Mexico, Arizona, and California.  Faced with an influx of 
immigration cases, local United States Attorneys sought to 
manage their caseloads by offering shorter sentences, in the 
form of a motion for downward departure or some other 
benefit, in exchange for the defendant‟s agreement to plead 
guilty immediately and waive appellate and other rights.  See 
generally Jane L. McClellan & Jon M. Sands, Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines and the Policy Paradox of Early 
Disposition Programs: A Primer on “Fast-Track” Sentences, 
38 Ariz. St. L. J. 517 (2006). 
 In 2003, Congress explicitly authorized downward 
departures in fast-track programs when it passed the 
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the 
Exploitation of Children Today Act (“PROTECT Act”), Pub. 
L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003).  The PROTECT Act 
“was part of a more general effort by Congress to deal with a 
perceived increase in the rate of departures from the 
Sentencing Guidelines.”  United States v. Arrelucea-Zamudio, 
 7 
581 F.3d 142, 145 (3d Cir. 2009).  As such, Congress directed 
the Sentencing Commission to “promulgate . . . a policy 
statement authorizing a downward departure of not more than 
4 levels if the Government files a motion for such departure 
pursuant to an early disposition program authorized by the 
Attorney General and the United States Attorney[.]”  
PROTECT Act, § 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. at 675.  In 
response, the Sentencing Commission created U.S.S.G. 
§ 5K3.1, which states that, “[u]pon motion of the 
Government, the court may depart downward not more than 4 
levels pursuant to an early disposition program authorized by 
the Attorney General of the United States and the United 
States Attorney for the district in which the court resides.” 
 Following passage of the PROTECT Act, the Attorney 
General issued a memorandum to all federal prosecutors 
discussing the authorization and administration of fast-track 
programs.  See Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att‟y 
Gen., Dep‟t of Justice, to U.S. Attorneys (Sept. 22, 2003), 
reprinted in 16 Fed. Sent. R. 134 (Dec. 2003) (“Ashcroft 
Memo”).2  While the Ashcroft Memo highlighted the need for 
                                                 
2
 The Ashcroft Memo set forth the following 
requirements for a district to obtain a fast-track program: 
(A)(1) the district confronts an exceptionally 
large number of a specific class of offenses 
within the district, and failure to handle such 
cases on an expedited or “fast-track” basis 
would significantly strain prosecutorial and 
judicial resources available in the district; or 
(2) the district confronts some other exceptional 
 8 
fast-track programs in districts with a high volume of 
immigration cases, it also made clear that “there may be some 
other exceptional local circumstance, other than the high 
incidence of a particular type of offense, that could 
conceivably warrant „fast-track‟ treatment.”  Id. at 135.  As of 
December 28, 2009, the Attorney General has approved 
twenty-five fast-track programs in seventeen judicial 
districts.
3
  Fourteen fast-track programs are authorized for 
                                                                                                             
local circumstance with respect to a specific 
class of cases that justifies expedited disposition 
of such cases; 
(B) declination of such cases in favor of state 
prosecution is either unavailable or clearly 
unwarranted; 
(C) the specific class of cases consists of ones 
that are highly repetitive and present 
substantially similar fact scenarios; and 
(D) the cases do not involve an offense that has 
been designated by the Attorney General as a 
“crime of violence.” 
 
16 Fed. Sent. R. at 134-35. 
 
3
 Fast-track programs have been implemented for a 
variety of classes of cases, including illegal reentry, 
transportation or harboring of aliens, alien smuggling, drug 
offenses, aggravated identity theft, and identification 
document fraud.  See Memorandum from David W. Ogden, 
Deputy Att‟y Gen., Dep‟t of Justice, to U.S. Attorneys (Dec. 
28, 2009) (Supp. App. for Appellee United States at 22-23.). 
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illegal reentry cases.
4
  The District of New Jersey does not 
have any kind of fast-track program.  Appellants‟ 
constitutional argument concerns the disparity in treatment 
between defendants in fast-track districts and defendants in 
non-fast-track districts, insofar as defendants in fast-track 
districts are eligible to obtain a downward departure as 
authorized in U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1, whereas defendants in non-
fast-track districts are not afforded this opportunity. 
A. Jose Lopez 
 Jose Lopez is a native and citizen of Mexico.  In 1994, 
he was convicted in New Jersey Superior Court of aggravated 
arson, and was subsequently deported to Mexico.  Thereafter, 
Lopez illegally reentered the United States and was arrested 
in New Jersey in 2009.  Lopez pled guilty to illegal reentry, in 
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2).
5
  The Probation 
                                                 
4
 These programs are implemented in the District of 
Arizona; the Central, Eastern, and Northern Districts of 
California; the District of Idaho; the District of Nebraska; the 
District of New Mexico; the District of Oregon; the District 
of Puerto Rico; the Southern District of Texas; the District of 
Utah; the Eastern and Western Districts of Washington; and 
the District of Wyoming. 
5
 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) provides:  
(a) In general 
Subject to subsection (b) of this section, any 
alien who - -  
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(1) has been denied admission, excluded, 
deported, or removed or has departed the United 
States while an order of exclusion, deportation, 
or removal is outstanding, and thereafter 
 
(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time 
found in, the United States, unless (A) prior to 
his reembarkation at a place outside the United 
States or his application for admission from 
foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney 
General has expressly consented to such alien‟s 
reapplying for admission; or (B) with respect to 
an alien previously denied admission and 
removed, unless such alien shall establish that 
he was not required to obtain such advance 
consent under this chapter or any prior Act, 
 
shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not 
more than 2 years, or both. 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) provides: 
 
(b) Criminal penalties for reentry of certain 
removed aliens notwithstanding subsection (a) 
of this section, in the case of any alien described 
in such subsection - -  
(2) whose removal was subsequent to a 
conviction for commission of an aggravated 
felony, such alien shall be fined under such title, 
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both[.] 
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Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) 
recommending a base offense level of eight, pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a), and a sixteen level increase, pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) because Lopez was previously 
deported after a conviction for a felony which is a crime of 
violence, namely the 1994 arson.  After subtracting three 
levels for acceptance of responsibility, the PSR recommended 
a total offense level of twenty-one and a criminal history 
category of II, yielding a Guidelines range of forty-one to 
fifty-one months‟ imprisonment. 
 Lopez argued that the District Court should vary from 
the Guidelines range because the availability of fast-track 
programs in some judicial districts but not others creates an 
unfair disparity.  The District Court refused to do so, and 
sentenced Lopez to forty-one months‟ imprisonment.  Lopez 
filed a timely notice of appeal. 
B. Pedro Esparza-Diaz 
 Pedro Esparza-Diaz is a native and citizen of Mexico.  
In 1995, he was convicted in California Superior Court of a 
felony drug offense and sentenced to three years‟ probation 
and three months‟ imprisonment.  In 1999, Esparza-Diaz was 
again convicted of drug possession and sentenced to three 
years‟ probation and nine months‟ imprisonment.  His 
probation was subsequently revoked in 2000, and he was 
sentenced to sixteen months‟ imprisonment for the 1995 
conviction and two years‟ imprisonment on the 1999 
conviction, to be served concurrently.  He was deported to 
Mexico in 2001.  Years later, he illegally returned to the 
United States where he was arrested in New Jersey in 2009 
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for traffic violations.  Thereafter, Esparza-Diaz pled guilty to 
illegal reentry, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). 
 The PSR recommended a base offense level of eight, 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a), plus a sixteen-level increase 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) because Esparza-Diaz 
was previously deported after he was convicted of a drug 
trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed exceeded 
thirteen months‟ imprisonment.6  As a result, the total offense 
level was twenty-one, after a three-level adjustment for 
acceptance of responsibility.  With a criminal history category 
of IV, the PSR recommended a Guidelines range of fifty-
seven to seventy-one months‟ imprisonment. 
 At sentencing, Esparza-Diaz argued that the District 
Court should vary from the Guidelines range based on the 
absence of a fast-track program in the District of New Jersey.  
The District Court declined to exercise that discretion and 
also refused to vary based on the time that Esparza-Diaz spent 
in custody awaiting indictment.  Esparza-Diaz was sentenced 
to sixty months‟ imprisonment and filed a timely notice of 
appeal. 
                                                 
6
 See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(vii) (“The length of 
the sentence of imprisonment includes any term of 
imprisonment given upon revocation of probation, parole, or 
supervised release.”). 
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C. Pedro Arrelucea-Zamudio 
 Pedro Arrelucea-Zamudio is a native and citizen of 
Peru.  In 1991, he was convicted in New Jersey Superior 
Court of drug possession and sentenced to twelve years‟ 
imprisonment.  In 1995, Arrelucea-Zamudio was deported to 
Peru.  Years later, he illegally reentered the United States.  In 
2006, he was convicted in New Jersey Superior Court of 
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.  After serving 
a portion of the prison sentence, he was charged with and 
pled guilty to illegal reentry, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1326(a) and (b)(2). 
 The PSR recommended a base offense level of eight, 
in accordance with U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a), and a sixteen-level 
increase, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) because 
Arrelucea-Zamudio was previously deported after being 
convicted of a drug trafficking offense for which the sentence 
imposed exceeded thirteen months‟ imprisonment.  With a 
three-level adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, the 
total offense level was twenty-one and the criminal history 
category was III, resulting in a Guidelines range of forty-six 
to fifty-seven months‟ imprisonment. 
At sentencing, Arrelucea-Zamudio requested a 
variance on the grounds that the absence of a fast-track 
program in the District of New Jersey caused a disparity 
among similarly situated defendants.  The District Court 
rejected this argument, believing that our decision in United 
States v. Vargas, 477 F.3d 94 (3d Cir. 2007), prohibited 
consideration of the fast-track disparity.  The District Court 
imposed a sentence of forty-eight months‟ imprisonment. 
 14 
 On appeal, we vacated Arrelucea-Zamudio‟s sentence 
because the District Court misapprehended its authority to 
consider the fast-track disparity.  See Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 
F.3d at 143  (holding that after the Supreme Court‟s decision 
in Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007), a district 
court has discretion to consider the absence of a fast-track 
sentencing option and vary on that basis).  On remand, 
Arrelucea-Zamudio argued that the sixteen-level 
enhancement for illegal reentry set forth at U.S.S.G. 
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) is inherently unreasonable.  Additionally, he 
renewed his argument that the District Court should vary on 
the basis of the fast-track disparity.  The District Court 
considered the arguments relative to § 2L1.2 and the fast-
track disparity, but declined to vary on either basis.  The 
District Court imposed a sentence of forty-six months‟ 
imprisonment and Arrelucea-Zamudio filed a timely notice of 
appeal. 
D. Silvestre Brito-Hernandez 
 Silvestre Brito-Hernandez is a native and citizen of the 
Dominican Republic.  He entered the United States as a 
lawful permanent resident in 1990.  In 1999, he was 
convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 
and deported to the Dominican Republic.  Brito-Hernandez 
illegally reentered the United States in 2003.  Shortly 
thereafter, he was arrested, pled guilty, and was sentenced to 
five years‟ imprisonment for drug possession.  While serving 
his state prison sentence, he was indicted and pled guilty to 
illegal reentry, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). 
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 The PSR recommended a base offense level of eight, 
as set forth in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a), and a sixteen-level 
increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) because 
Brito-Hernandez was previously deported after being 
convicted for a felony drug trafficking offense for which the 
sentence imposed exceeded thirteen months‟ imprisonment.  
With a three-level adjustment for acceptance of 
responsibility, the total offense level was twenty-one and the 
criminal history category was III, generating a Guidelines 
range of forty-six to fifty-seven months‟ imprisonment. 
 During the sentencing hearing, Brito-Hernandez 
requested a variance on the basis that the sixteen-level 
enhancement to the offense level set forth at U.S.S.G. 
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) was unreasonable and that the fast-track 
system created an unfair sentencing disparity between 
similarly situated defendants.  The District Court rejected 
these arguments and sentenced him to forty-six months‟ 
imprisonment. 
 On January 5, 2010, we summarily vacated Brito-
Hernandez‟s sentenced, as a result of our ruling in Arrelucea-
Zamudio, because, as in that case, the District Court did not 
believe it had discretion to vary based on the fast-track 
disparity argument.  On remand, Brito-Hernandez renewed 
his arguments with respect to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 and the fast-
track disparity.  The District Court declined to exercise its 
discretion to vary, and imposed a sentence of forty-six 
months‟ imprisonment.  Brito-Hernandez filed a timely notice 
of appeal. 
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II.  Standard of Review 
 While we generally review constitutional claims de 
novo, see United States v. Gordon, 290 F.3d 539, 546 (3d Cir. 
2002), constitutional challenges not raised before the district 
court are subject to plain error review.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 
52(b); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 
(1993).  We review sentences for procedural and substantive 
reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard.  Gall v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).  In addition, we 
“review factual findings relevant to the Guidelines for clear 
error.”  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 
2007) (en banc).
7
 
                                                 
7
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
 The government claims that Appellants lack standing 
to challenge the constitutionality of U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1, as 
implemented by the DOJ and directed by Congress in the 
PROTECT Act.  We must resolve this question at the outset 
because Appellants‟ ability to raise this constitutional 
challenge implicates our jurisdiction under Article III of the 
Constitution.  See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 
U.S. 83, 97-98 (1998).  “A party has standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it has an adverse 
impact on his own rights.”  Count Court of Ulster County, 
N.Y. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154-55 (1979).  Appellants must 
demonstrate that they “have suffered an injury in fact” that is 
“fairly trace[ab]le to the challenged action of the defendant,” 
 17 
III.  Discussion 
                                                                                                             
and that it is likely “that the injury will be redressed by a 
favorable decision.”  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 560-61 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Appellants have alleged that they received sentences 
without the benefit of a fast-track departure, thereby 
subjecting them to a sentencing process that was implemented 
in an arbitrary manner and contrary to their Fifth Amendment 
rights.  This injury is concrete and actual, as Appellants have 
already been sentenced.  See Chapman v. United States, 500 
U.S. 453, 465 (1991) (“[T]he court may impose, whatever 
punishment is authorized by statute . . . so long as the penalty 
is not based on an arbitrary distinction that would violate the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” (internal 
citations omitted)); see also Ne. Fl. Chapter of the Assoc. 
Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 
656, 666 (1993) (“The „injury in fact‟ in an equal protection 
case . . . is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the 
imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain 
the benefit.”).  Second, this injury is “fairly trace[ab]le” to the 
DOJ‟s implementation of fast-track programs in some 
districts but not others.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.  Third, the 
injury is redressable because a favorable ruling that the 
operation of the fast-track program is unconstitutional would 
essentially require a district court to depart four levels, as 
done in fast-track districts, thereby eliminating the alleged 
unfairness.  Because Appellants have standing, we proceed 
with our analysis of their Fifth Amendment claim. 
 18 
A. Constitutionality of the DOJ’s Implementation of 
U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1 
 Appellants assert that the fast-track program “produces 
a „wholly arbitrary‟ sentencing discrepancy and violates 
[their] Fifth Amendment right to be free from arbitrary 
sentencing practices.”  (Br. of Appellant Jose Lopez at 14.)  
Because the distinction in treatment between defendants in 
fast-track and non-fast-track judicial districts does not 
implicate a suspect class, nor burden a fundamental right, we 
determine – and Appellants concede (id. at 11) – that rational 
basis review is appropriate here.
8
  “If a statute neither burdens 
a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, it does not 
violate equal protection so long as it bears a rational 
relationship to some legitimate end.”  Doe v. Pa. Bd. of 
Probation & Parole, 513 F.3d 95, 107 (3d Cir. 2008).  Under 
rational basis review, a classification will be upheld “if there 
is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment 
and some legitimate governmental purpose.”  Heller v. Doe, 
509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993).  The party challenging the 
                                                 
8
 Although the Fifth Amendment by its own terms 
does not reference equal protection, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted it to include an equal protection element.  See 
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).  Because the 
Supreme Court‟s analysis of Fifth Amendment equal 
protection claims has been identical to equal protection 
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, we proceed 
accordingly here.  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 
(1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 
(1975). 
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classification bears the burden to negate “every conceivable 
basis which might support it[.]”  Id.  At oral argument, 
Appellants conceded that they did not raise this constitutional 
claim before the District Court.  Thus, we apply plain error 
review.  See Olano, 507 U.S. at 731.  “Plain error exists only 
when (1) an error was committed (2) that was plain, and 
(3) that affected the defendant‟s substantial rights.”  United 
States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 2007). 
Every court of appeals to have considered the issue has 
upheld the DOJ‟s implementation of fast-track programs on a 
district-by-district basis under rational basis review.  See 
United States v. Rodriguez, 523 F.3d 519, 527 (5th Cir. 
2008); United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 526 F.3d 804, 808 
(5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Llanos-Agostadero, 486 F.3d 
1194, 1199 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Andujar-Arias, 
507 F.3d 734, 749 (1st Cir. 2007), abrogated on other 
grounds by United States v. Rodriguez, 527 F.3d 221 (1st Cir. 
2008); United States v. Marcial-Santiago, 447 F.3d 715, 719 
(9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Campos-Diaz, 472 F.3d 
1278, 1280 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Melendez-
Torres, 420 F.3d 45, 53 (1st Cir. 2005), abrogated on other 
grounds by United States v. Anonymous Defendant, 629 F.3d 
68 (1st Cir. 2010). 
These courts of appeals have identified a number of 
rational bases for the difference in treatment of defendants in 
fast-track and non-fast-track districts.  In Marcial-Santiago, 
the Ninth Circuit upheld the fast-track program against an 
equal protection challenge, ruling that “the government has a 
legitimate interest in conserving prosecutorial and judicial 
resources in districts with large numbers of immigration 
 20 
cases, and fast-track programs are rationally related to that 
interest.”  447 F.3d at 719.  Similarly, the Fifth Circuit 
determined that “[t]he current structure of the fast-track 
program is rationally related to, among others, the goals of 
promoting judicial efficiency, preserving prosecutorial 
discretion, and limiting downward departures overall.”  
Lopez-Velasquez, 526 F.3d at 808.  The Eleventh Circuit has 
reached the same conclusion.  See Campos-Diaz, 472 F.3d at 
1280 (“The fast-track program is rationally related to the 
legitimate government interest of conserving prosecutorial 
and judicial resources and easing congestion in judicial 
districts with a high volume of immigration cases.”).  
Decisions of the First Circuit are in accord.  See Andujar-
Arias, 507 F.3d at 749 (“[W]e find that [fast-track] programs 
have not been implemented in a manner that is so attenuated 
as to render the [Congressionally established] distinction 
arbitrary or irrational.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Melendez-Torres, 420 F.3d at 53 (noting that prosecutorial 
discretion and resource allocation constitute “a reasonably 
conceivable set of facts that could provide a rational basis for 
the classification” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Appellants concede that there is a rational basis for 
establishing fast-track programs in judicial districts with a 
high volume of immigration cases.  (Br. of Appellant Jose 
Lopez at 10.)  The crux of their claim, however, targets the 
implementation of fast-track programs in districts with a low 
volume of immigration cases – namely, in the Western 
District of Washington and the District of Nebraska.  
Appellants rely on the volume of immigration-related cases 
per district and the number of immigration-related cases per 
 21 
Assistant United States Attorney to argue that the DOJ‟s 
approval of fast-track programs lacks a rational basis.  
Specifically, Appellants point to statistics demonstrating that 
immigration offenses compose only 12.3% and 13.2% of the 
criminal docket in the District of Nebraska and the Western 
District of Washington, respectively.  (Id. at 11.)  Moreover, 
they highlight that immigration cases make up 26.6% of the 
criminal docket in the District of Nevada, yet that district has 
no fast-track program.  (Id. at 12.)  Appellants argue that the 
fact that the District of Nebraska and the Western District of 
Washington have fast-track programs, while no such program 
is in place in the District of Nevada, demonstrates that the 
DOJ has implemented fast-track programs in an 
unconstitutional manner.  We are not persuaded. 
 The Ashcroft Memo makes clear that the presence of a 
high volume of immigration cases is not the only reason to 
authorize a fast-track program.  Rather, fast-track programs 
may be sanctioned when “the district confronts some other 
exceptional local circumstance with respect to a specific class 
of cases that justifies expedited disposition of such cases.”  16 
Fed. Sent. R. at 134.  Even where a district does not confront 
a high volume of immigration cases, the Ashcroft Memo 
states that this “does not foreclose the possibility that there 
may be some other exceptional local circumstances, other 
than the high incidence of a particular type of offense, that 
could conceivably warrant „fast-track‟ treatment.”  Id.  To 
that end, we determine that the endorsement of fast-track 
programs in districts with a low volume of immigration cases 
is rationally related to, among other things, the purposes of 
efficiently prosecuting illegal reentry cases and dealing with 
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demands regarding allocation of prosecutorial resources.  If a 
particular district is ill-equipped to handle illegal reentry 
prosecutions due to, for example, an influx of cases or a 
recurring type of case, a fast-track program will enable that 
district to manage its caseload efficiently.  The fact that some 
districts with a high volume of immigration cases do not have 
fast-track programs does not mean that the program is 
operated in an unconstitutional manner.  Those districts, such 
as the District of Nevada, may be better prepared to prosecute 
immigration cases and have no need for such a program.  The 
DOJ‟s implementation of the fast-track program is rationally 
related to the objective of managing shortages in 
prosecutorial resources and enforcing the immigration laws, 
not only dealing with the challenge of a large volume of 
immigration cases. 
 The First Circuit reached the same conclusion in 
Andujar-Arias, 507 F.3d at 744-45.  There, the defendant 
argued that the existence of fast-track programs in districts 
such as the Western District of Washington and the District of 
Nebraska where immigration cases account for a low 
percentage of the caseload demonstrated that the programs 
were implemented in an unconstitutional manner.  The court 
refused to strike down the program based on statistics 
regarding the number of cases alone.  Notably, the court 
reasoned that “[w]hen Congress authorized the Attorney 
General to approve fast-track programs, it did not restrict the 
criteria for such programs to the mere proportion of each 
district‟s caseload” but instead “allowed the Attorney General 
to evaluate such factors as the number and type of 
immigration cases encountered by each district and the 
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quality and variety of resources each district could marshal in 
response.”  Id. at 744.  We agree.  Evaluating only the 
percentage of immigration cases “obscures the fact that 
different types of cases may require different types and 
amounts of resources.”  Id.  This is because “judgments 
regarding resource allocation can rarely be reduced to a single 
variable or calculation.”  Id. at 745.  Appellants‟ statistical 
references do not establish that fast-track programs are 
administered unlawfully. 
 Appellants seize on language from our decision in 
Arrelucea-Zamudio where we stated that “it does not appear 
to be clear to the [Sentencing] Commission (based on its 
limited statistical analysis), nor is it evident to us, why some 
districts have fast-track programs while others do not.”  581 
F.3d at 154.  Thus, Appellants claim that “[a]n unidentifiable 
basis for a sentencing discrepancy is not a rational one.”  (Br. 
of Appellant Pedro Arrelucea-Zamudio at 24.)  Appellant‟s 
reliance on Arrelucea-Zamudio is misplaced.
9
  In Arrelucea-
Zamudio, we held that a district court may consider the fast-
                                                 
9
 Further, this argument inappropriately attempts to 
place the burden of proof on the government.  See Heller v 
Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (“[T]he burden is on the one 
attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every 
conceivable basis which might support it” (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).); see also United States v. Ruiz-
Chairz, 493 F.3d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he 
government shoulders no burden to proffer a basis for a 
distinction that Congress and the Sentencing Commission 
have made.”). 
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track disparity and exercise its discretion to vary from the 
Guidelines range when sentencing a defendant for illegal 
reentry.  581 F.3d at 143.  The case did not involve a 
constitutional challenge to the fast-track program, nor did we 
hold that the DOJ‟s implementation of U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1 
lacked a rational basis.  Even if fast-track programs are not 
authorized in an easily identifiable manner, it does not render 
the DOJ‟s operation of such programs unconstitutional.  To 
the contrary, our inquiry is limited to evaluating whether 
“there is any conceivable state of facts that could provide a 
rational basis for the classification.”  Heller, 509 U.S. at 320 
(emphasis added).  As we have already noted, the DOJ‟s 
authorization of fast-track programs is rationally related to the 
permissible goals of efficiently enforcing the immigration 
laws and allocating prosecutorial resources where they are 
most needed. 
There are several justifiable reasons for allowing the 
United States Attorney General and the United States 
Attorney for each judicial district to evaluate the distribution 
of prosecutorial resources in enforcing the immigration laws.  
Appellants fall far short of their burden to demonstrate that 
there is no conceivable basis for the DOJ‟s endorsement of 
fast-track programs in some districts but not others.  Having 
identified no constitutional error, Appellants cannot 
demonstrate that the District Courts committed plain error by 
not striking down Congress‟s directive regarding 
implementation of fast-track programs by the DOJ.  See 
United States v. Castro, 455 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(noting that defendant could not establish plain error when no 
court “has held that the limited availability of the fast-track 
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departure violates equal protection”).  Thus, Appellants‟ Fifth 
Amendment argument lacks merit. 
B. Reasonableness of Sentences 
 Having determined that Appellants‟ Fifth Amendment 
challenge to the DOJ‟s implementation of U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1 
provides no basis for relief, we turn to Appellants‟ arguments 
regarding the reasonableness of the sentences they received.  
Our framework for reviewing sentences is well-established.  
“First, we determine whether the sentencing court correctly 
calculated the Guidelines range.”  United States v. Fisher, 
502 F.3d 293, 308 (3d Cir. 2007).  “Next, we determine 
whether the trial court considered the § 3553(a) factors and 
any sentencing grounds properly raised by the parties which 
have recognized legal merit and factual support in the 
record.”  Id.  (internal quotation marks omitted).  Then, “we 
ascertain whether those factors were reasonably applied to the 
circumstances of the case.”  Id.  (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  After confirming that the district court followed the 
proper procedural requirements, “we review the resulting 
sentence to ensure that it is substantively reasonable.”  Id.  
We will review each Appellant‟s sentence individually. 
 1. Jose Lopez 
 Lopez argues that the District Court committed 
procedural error by refusing to give meaningful consideration 
to the fast-track disparity.  (Br. of Appellant Jose Lopez at 14-
15.)  Specifically, Lopez insists that the District Court 
“simply declined to accept the validity of the fast-track 
disparity.”  (Id. at 17.)  We disagree. 
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 In Arrelucea-Zamudio, we held that “a sentencing 
judge has the discretion to consider a variance under the 
totality of the § 3553(a) factors (rather than one factor in 
isolation) on the basis of a defendant‟s fast-track argument, 
and that such a variance would be reasonable in an 
appropriate case.”  581 F.3d at 149.  “In sentencing a 
defendant for illegal reentry in a non-fast-track district . . . a 
sentencing court „must make an individualized assessment 
based on the facts presented,‟ and „judge their import under 
§ 3553(a).‟”  Id. at 166 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50-51).  We 
did not conclude that a district court must consider the fast-
track disparity and vary on that basis.  Rather, we determined 
that if a district court chooses to exercise its discretion 
because it has a policy disagreement with U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1, 
then it must evaluate the fast-track disparity with regard to the 
totality of the § 3553(a) factors to ensure that the resulting 
sentence will be reasonable.  See id.  In fact, we emphasized 
that our previous holding in United States v. Vargas, 477 F.3d 
94, 99 (3d Cir. 2007), “that it is not an abuse of a sentencing 
judge‟s discretion to decline to vary on the basis of the fast-
track disparity – remains viable after Kimbrough.”  Id. at 148.  
The procedural error in Arrelucea-Zamudio was the district 
court‟s mistaken belief that it did not have discretion to vary 
based on the fast-track disparity.  See id. at 149.  That is not 
what occurred here. 
 The District Court correctly calculated a Guidelines 
range of forty-one to fifty-one months‟ imprisonment.  At 
sentencing, the District Court noted: 
[L]ooking at the arguments that are made by the 
defense which I referred to before, starting out 
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with the fact that some jurisdictions have a fast-
track program and that New Jersey does not, I 
do not think that is an appropriate basis to 
exercise my discretion under 3553[a] or 
otherwise.  Indeed, to do that would be to take 
what seems to be a rather unique program and 
make it nationwide.  We have an obligation 
really to avoid unwarranted disparities.  I think 
we‟d be creating unwarranted disparities . . . . I 
do not think that the variance on the basis of a 
lack of a fast-track program would be an 
appropriate exercise of discretion here[.] 
(App. of Appellant Jose Lopez at 38-39.)  The District Court 
acknowledged that it could vary based on the fast-track 
disparity when it stated that it would not “exercise [its] 
discretion,” (id.), on that basis.  In doing so, it explained why 
it believed a variance was inappropriate, even though it was 
permitted, thereby meaningfully considering Lopez‟s request.  
Lopez‟s argument on this point lacks merit. 
 Next, Lopez asserts that his sentence is procedurally 
and substantively unreasonable because the District Court 
ignored the need to “impose a sentence sufficient, but not 
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greater than necessary,” as stated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).10  
The record belies this contention.  The District Court 
specifically noted that “the sentence at the bottom of the 
advisory guideline range is reasonable and no greater than 
necessary to comply with the statutory purpose.  We have a 
serious offense that needs to be dealt with seriously.”  (Id. at 
41.)  The District Court explicitly found that a Guidelines 
range sentence was necessary, taking into consideration 
Lopez‟s background.  We cannot say that “no reasonable 
sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on 
that particular defendant for the reasons the district court 
provided.”  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (en banc).  The District Court reasonably 
concluded that a sufficient sentence in a fast-track district 
                                                 
10
 In challenging the substantive reasonableness of 
their sentences, each Appellant argues that his sentence is 
unreasonable because the implementation of fast-track 
programs in various judicial districts violates his Fifth 
Amendment right to be free from arbitrary sentencing 
practices.  This argument recapitulates Appellants‟ 
unsuccessful constitutional argument, and we do not address 
it further. 
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would not be sufficient in Lopez‟s case.11  Thus, we 
determine that a sentence of forty-one months‟ imprisonment 
is reasonable.  
 2. Pedro Esparza-Diaz 
 Esparza-Diaz asserts that the District Court committed 
procedural error in relying on clearly erroneous factual 
findings in denying his request for a variance to account for 
the time he spent in custody awaiting indictment for illegal 
reentry.  “A district court commits significant procedural 
error – and thus abuses its discretion – when . . . it bases its 
                                                 
11
 To the extent Lopez argues that because “the district 
court imposed a Guidelines sentence in a case 
indistinguishable from the thousands across the country 
which typically qualify for fast-track departures[,] . . . this 
greater sentence . . . violat[es] parsimony” (Br. of Appellant 
Jose Lopez at 21), we note that we specifically recognized in 
Arrelucea-Zamudio that “a district court is under no 
obligation to impose a sentence below the applicable 
Guidelines range solely on the basis of the [fast-track 
disparity].”  581 F.3d at 148 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted); see also United States v. Llanos-
Agostadero, 486 F.3d 1194, 1199 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e 
cannot say that the sentences received by defendants in 
districts without fast-track programs are „greater than 
necessary‟ to achieve the purposes of § 3553(a)(2) solely 
because similarly-situated defendants in districts with fast-
track programs are eligible to receive lesser sentences.” 
(emphasis in original)). 
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calculation of the advisory Guidelines range on a clearly 
erroneous finding of fact[.]”  United States v. Starnes, 583 
F.3d 196, 215 (3d Cir. 2009).  In that regard, “[a] [factual] 
finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence 
to support it, the reviewing body on the entire evidence is left 
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.”  Id.  (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), “[a] defendant shall 
be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment 
for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date 
the sentence commences[.]”  The definition of “official 
detention” is provided in Bureau of Prisons Program 
Statement 5880.28: 
Official detention does not include time spent in 
the custody of the U.S. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) under the 
provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252 pending a final 
determination of deportability.  An inmate 
being held by INS being a civil deportation 
proceeding is not being held in “official 
detention” pending criminal charges. 
BOP P.S. 5880.28, 1-15A.  Esparza-Diaz was arrested for 
traffic violations on February 12, 2009.  An agent from 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) interviewed 
him on February 20, 2009.  On February 24, 2009, the ICE 
Agent returned for another interview with Esparza-Diaz.  In 
the Record of Sworn Statement completed on that day, the 
ICE Agent described the matter as “In the case of: Reentry 
Prosecution 8 USC 1326 or 1325,” in other words, a criminal 
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illegal reentry prosecution.  Esparza-Diaz was indicted on 
June 16, 2009. 
 Before the District Court, Esparza-Diaz requested a 
variance on the grounds that he should be given credit for the 
time he spent in ICE custody from February 24 to June 16, 
2009 because he was in “official detention” pending an illegal 
reentry prosecution.  The District Court declined to formally 
grant the variance, finding that the Record of Sworn 
Statement did not make certain that Esparza-Diaz would be 
prosecuted for illegal reentry.  The District Court noted that 
while the individual ICE Agent‟s intent may have been clear, 
any criminal prosecution would have to be approved by the 
United States Attorney‟s Office.  Although the District Court 
did not grant the request, it did state that it was “not going to 
give him the maximum under the guideline top of the range” 
and that “defense counsel‟s arguments do have some merit, 
particularly the fact that he‟s been in custody for months 
before this prosecution began.”  (App. of Appellant Pedro 
Esparza-Diaz at 86.) 
The District Court‟s finding that Esparza-Diaz was not 
in “official detention” during this time period was not clearly 
erroneous.  Aside from the ICE Agent‟s statement, there is no 
record from the government to indicate that a definitive 
decision regarding criminal prosecution was made.  Because 
the record does not leave us with a “definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed,” Starnes, 583 
F.3d at 215, there is no clear error.  Moreover, the record 
reflects that the District Court did give some consideration to 
Esparza-Diaz‟s argument because it sentenced him at the 
bottom of the Guidelines range.  The District Court correctly 
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calculated a Guidelines range of fifty-seven to seventy-one 
months‟ imprisonment, and did not commit procedural error. 
Like Lopez, Esparza-Diaz contends that his sentence is 
substantively unreasonable because it violates the provision in 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) instructing courts to impose a sentence 
sufficient but not greater than necessary.  At sentencing, the 
District Court expressed the concern that a below-Guidelines 
sentence would not be sufficient punishment after evaluating 
the specific characteristics of Esparza-Diaz.  Significantly, the 
District Court noted that it had “the authority under the law to 
vary downward because of [the fast-track disparity], but I 
choose not to because of his criminal record and history.”  
(App. of Appellant Pedro Esparza-Diaz at 85.)  Thus, the 
District Court exercised its discretion to impose a sentence it 
believed was “sufficient, but not greater than necessary.”  18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a).  Because “the record as a whole reflects 
rational and meaningful consideration of the factors 
enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),” Grier, 475 F.3d at 571, 
we determine that Esparza-Diaz‟s sentence was reasonable.12 
3. Pedro Arrelucea-Zamudio & Silvestre Brito-
Hernandez
13
 
 Both Arrelucea-Zamudio and Brito-Hernandez 
maintain that their sentences are substantively unreasonable 
                                                 
12
 See also  supra n.11. 
13
 Arrelucea-Zamudio and Brito-Hernandez do not 
challenge the procedural reasonableness of their sentences. 
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because the District Court relied on the sixteen-level 
enhancement to the offense level set forth at U.S.S.G. 
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) in calculating their Guidelines ranges.
14
  
Specifically, they claim that § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) was enacted 
with no apparent justification and results in Guidelines ranges 
that are disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense of 
illegal reentry.  Thus, they assert, the District Court abused its 
discretion in relying on it. 
 We addressed a similar argument in United States v. 
Lopez-Reyes, 589 F.3d 667 (3d Cir. 2009).  In that case, 
Lopez-Reyes pled guilty to illegal reentry after previously 
being convicted of a crime of violence.  After the district 
                                                 
14
 U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 states, in relevant part: 
(a) Base Offense Level: 8 
(b) Specific Offense Characteristic 
(1) Apply the Greatest: 
If the defendant was previously deported, 
or unlawfully remained in the United 
States, after –  
(A) a conviction for a felony that is (i) a 
drug trafficking offense for which the 
sentence imposed exceeded 13 months; 
(ii) a crime of violence; (iii) a firearms 
offense; (iv) a  child pornography 
offense; (v) a national security or 
terrorism offense; (vi) a human 
trafficking offense; or (vii) an alien 
smuggling offense, increase by 16 
levels[.] 
 34 
court calculated his offense level pursuant to 
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), it imposed a within-Guidelines range 
sentence.  On appeal, Lopes-Reyes argued, inter alia, that the 
sixteen-level enhancement in § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) is 
unreasonable and that the district court failed to 
independently analyze the potential problems with the 
Guideline.  In determining that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in applying § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), we reiterated that 
“Kimbrough does not require a district court to reject a 
particular Guidelines range where the court does not, in fact, 
have a disagreement with the Guideline at issue.”  Id. at 671.  
After concluding that the district court engaged in an 
appropriate exercise of discretion with regard to the § 3553(a) 
factors, we emphasized that “[t]he applicable Guidelines 
range here is not rendered unreasonable simply because 
§ 2L1.2 establishes a base offense level for a nonviolent 
offense that is equal or greater than that of certain violent 
offenses.  Congress „has the power to define a crime and set 
its punishments.‟”  Id.  (quoting United States v. MacEwan, 
445 F.3d 237, 252 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
The reasoning of Lopez-Reyes applies with equal force 
here.  Both District Courts were aware of their authority to 
disregard § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) on policy grounds after 
Kimbrough.  (App. of Appellant Pedro Arrelucea-Zamudio at 
183; App. of Appellant Silvestre Brito-Hernandez at 143-44.)  
But, neither District Court disagreed with the Guideline and 
declined to exercise discretion on that basis.  Because the 
District Courts were not required to disregard 
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) when they did not disagree with it, see 
Lopez-Reyes, 589 F.3d at 671, our inquiry is limited to 
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whether the sentences imposed “fall[] within the broad range 
of possible sentences that can be considered reasonable in 
light of the § 3553(a) factors.”  United States v. Wise, 515 
F.3d 207, 218 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 With respect to Arrelucea-Zamudio, the District Court 
thoroughly considered the § 3553(a) factors.  The District 
Court remarked on Arrelucea-Zamudio‟s history of drug 
convictions, the need for deterrence, and the goal of avoiding 
unwarranted sentencing disparities.  In doing so, it 
specifically reflected on the individual characteristics of 
Arrelucea-Zamudio, and reached a decision that “was 
premised upon appropriate and judicious consideration of the 
relevant factors.”  Lessner, 498 F.3d at 204 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  We determine that the District 
Court imposed a reasonable sentence of forty-six months‟ 
imprisonment. 
 As to Brito-Hernandez, the District Court likewise did 
not abuse its discretion.  The record reflects that the District 
Court considered the seriousness of the offense and the need 
to promote deterrence, in light of the fact that Brito-
Hernandez had illegally reentered the United States on 
several occasions and accumulated multiple drug convictions.  
Because “the record as a whole reflects rational and 
meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a),” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567, we determine that 
a sentence of forty-six months‟ imprisonment was reasonable. 
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IV. 
 We hold that the current structure of the fast-track 
program is rationally related to, among others, the goals of 
allocating prosecutorial resources and enforcing the 
immigration laws.  Further, we determine that the sentences 
Appellants received after pleading guilty to illegal reentry 
were reasonable.  For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm 
the judgments of sentence entered by each District Court. 
